In Defense of the Constitutionality of Critically Discussing Religion and Ethics in Schools in Light of Free Exercise and Parental Rights by Young, Michael
In Defense of the Constitutionality of Critically
Discussing Religion and Ethics in Schools in Light
of Free Exercise and Parental Rights
MICHAEL YOUNG*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1566
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGE ............................................... 1572
A. The History of Free Exercise and the Applicable Legal Standard
of R eview ................................................................................ 1572
1. A Short History of the Free Exercise Clause ....................... 1572
2. Which Standard of Review Applies to a Critical Discussions
C hallenge? .......................................................................... 1577
B. Locating the Substantial Burden ............................................. 1579
1. Psychological Discomfort/Mere Offensiveness ................... 1579
2. Coercion and Exposure ....................................................... 1581
3. Coercion and Belief Determination ..................................... 1585
4. Identity-Shifting and Yoder ................................................. 1589
5. "Substantial Burden " Requires a Direct and Particular Clash
Between a Deeply Held Principle and a State-Mandated (or
Incentivized) Activity ........................................................... 1591
C. The State 's Compelling Interest ............................................. 1592
1. Critical Discussions and Skills of Open Discourse ............. 1594
2. The Interest of the State in Developing Skills of
Open D iscourse ................................................................... 1595
3. Students 'Interests in Critical Discussions .......................... 1597
III. THE PARENTAL RIGHTS CHALLENGE ......................................... 1599
A. "Fundamental" Parental Rights and Rational
B asis R eview .......................................................................... 1600
B. Parental Veto Power over Curriculum and the Content of
P arental R ights ...................................................................... 1603
IV . C ONCLUSION ............................................................................. 1606
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. B.A.,
Philosophy, magna cum laude, The College of Wooster. The author can be reached by
email at immichaelyoung@gmail.com. The author gratefully acknowledges the following
individuals for their thoughtful comments and reviews of earlier drafts of this work: John
Biancamano, Mahmoud EI-Youssef, Prof. David Goldberger, and Moran Nussbaum. Any
errors and faults in this work are the author's alone.
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a state required all secondary students-whether private, public,
or home-schooled-to take a course that might be called "Critical
Discussions." In this course, ethical, political, and religious themes and
topics would be discussed in an analytical way. Ethical dilemmas would be
posed for class discussion, and the truth value of religious claims debated.
Students would be encouraged to imagine viewpoints other than their own,
although not in a way that reduced all ethical principles and values to mere
subjective preference. Every student would be expected to participate in the
discussion, which would be guided by a teacher with some basic background
knowledge of the class topics.
Assuming that the above-described program would face certain
opposition from some religious objectors, this Note aims to assess the
constitutionality of such a course in the event that a state would make it
mandatory.
At present, Critical Discussions is a fiction; no state mandates such a
dedicated course, although some curriculums do engage broader ethical
themes or approach religion in a factual way. For example, some states
require the study of religion as part of a history or social studies curriculum.'
In other systems, a conscious attempt to imbue students with traditional
virtues is made.2 None of these programs, however, mandates participation in
a separate course dedicated solely to the open discussion of controversial
ethical and religious topics.3
Nevertheless, this fictional Critical Discussions course tracks real
proposals and existing non-U.S. curriculums endorsing the idea of a dialogic
ethics education. Academic philosophers, for example, have sometimes
advanced critical classroom engagement with big questions as part of a
1 See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., HIsTORY-SOCIAL SCIENCE CONTENT STANDARDS
FOR CAL. PUB. SCHS. 18, 24 (Bob Klingensmith, ed., 1998), available at
http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/histsocscistnd.pdf, CONN. STATE DEP'T OF
EDUC., Div. OF TEACHING AND LEARNING, CONN. SOC. STUDIES CURRICULUM
FRAMEWORK 152 (1998), available at http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/PDF/
Curriculum/CurriculumRootWebFolder/frsocst.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Ark. Dep't of Educ., Character-Centered Teaching, http://arkansased.org/
teachers/cct.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2009); Bureau of Curriculum and Instruction, Fla.
Dep't of Educ., Character Education, http://www.fldoe.org/bii/Curriculum/
SocialStudies/ ce.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
3 One state, Maine, however, does profess a commitment to promoting "ethical
reasoning" skills across the high school social studies curriculum. ME. DEP'T OF EDUC.,




separate course of "Philosophy for Children."' 4 Although not explicitly
connected to the "Philosophy for Children" movement, a "humanist applied
ethics" curriculum with some features similar to Critical Discussions may be
adopted for all schoolchildren in Victoria, Australia. 5 In 2004, a British
think-tank held a conference on religious education where some participants
proposed questioning the truth of religious claims in the classroom. 6 In
Berlin in 2005, dedicated ethics and religious coursework from a secular,
non-sectarian viewpoint became compulsory. 7 Stephen Law, a prominent
British philosopher, proposes mandatory class time in which students can be
taught ethics in a liberal, non-authoritarian way through a guided discussion
by a teacher with some basic philosophical competence. 8
These proposals and programs generally involve questioning religion in
some broad senses. For some of the above programs, the questioning of
4 "Philosophy for Children" encompasses more than dialogue about ethical
controversies, but can include such discussion. See, e.g., Harry Brighouse, The Role of
Philosophical Thinking in Teaching Controversial Issues, in PHILOSOPHY IN SCHOOLS 61,
62 (Michael Hand & Carrie Winstanley eds., 2008) ("Philosophical education concerning
controversial issues is urgently important in a democracy."). See generally PHILOSOPHY
IN SCHOOLS, supra (a collection of essays from philosophers discussing and arguing in
favor of "Philosophy for Children" programs, or aspects of such programs).
5 Michael Bachelard, Religion in Schools to Go God-Free, THE AGE, Dec. 14, 2008,
at 1, available at http://www.theage.com.au/national/religion-in-schools-to-go-godfree-
20081213-6xxs.html?page=-1 (making clear, however, that objecting religious parents
could opt out); see also Harry Gardner, Ethical Education, http://www.
ethicaleducation.netlindex.php?pr=HomePage (last visited Aug. 20, 2009) [hereinafter
Gardner, Ethical Education] (website devoted to and describing the curriculum). In
private correspondence with the author, Dr. Gardner acknowledged the curriculum's
underlying embrace of non-authoritarianism about ethics education, classroom
discussion, and the development of ethical imagination. Letter from Harry Gardner to
Michael Young (Dec. 26, 2008) (on file with the author).
6 INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RESEARCH, WHAT Is RELIGIOUS EDUCATION FOR?: GETTING
THE NATIONAL FRAMEWORK RIGHT 6, 15 (2004), available at http://www.ippr.org/
uploadedFiles/research/events/Education/RE%/20Event /%20Report.pdf [hereinafter
IPPR]. The idea of questioning the truth claims of religion in religion classes was
ultimately rejected. See QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM AUTHORITY, RELIGIOUS
AUTHRITY, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: THE STATUTORY NATIONAL FRAMEWORK 36-37
(2004), available at http://www.qcda.gov.uk/libraryAssets/media/9817_re-national_
framework_04.pdf.
7 Hardy Graupner, Row Erupts Over Ethics and Religion Ruling, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
Apr. 14, 2005, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1551981,00.html. The Berlin
program, opposed by religious groups, faced a popular referendum in April 2009, but was
not defeated. Berlin Referendum Fails at the Polls, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Apr. 27, 2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/0, 1518,621281,00.html.
8 STEPHEN LAW, THE WAR FOR CHILDREN'S MINDS, 165-66 (Routledge 2006)
[hereinafter LAw, CHILDREN'S MINDS].
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religion amounts to discussing ethics or ethical topics in a way that does not
necessarily assume the truth of religion or religious claims. 9 Others propose
to literally question religious claims outright as part of a dedicated course.10
Because of this involved questioning, these proposals and programs have met
hostility from those fearing an attempt to undermine their particular religious
or ethical views. 1 In its starkest form, the fear is that such courses would
corrode children's particular religious faith.12
As used herein, "Critical Discussions" is simply this Note's label for any
high school ethics course containing those questioning features of a secular
ethics course feared and opposed by religious objectors. This fiction means
to conveniently capture the critical (and potentially objectionable) features of
the particular proposals and courses. For the sake of sharpening the ensuing
discussion, it should be assumed that students in Critical Discussions would
be asked to question religion in both of the senses specified above: by
sometimes discussing ethics in a way that does not assume the truth of
religious claims, and by sometimes literally being posed questions for
discussion such as, "Does God exist?"
Additionally, it should be assumed that students in the Critical
Discussions class would not be coerced to accept or appear to accept any
particular ethical or religious viewpoint. For example, teachers would have
the responsibility to curb any kind of class discussion between students that
devolved into personal attacks or other forms of illegitimate coercion. 13
9 See generally Gardner, Ethical Education, supra note 5.
10 IPPR, supra note 6, at 15.
11 See, e.g., id.; Bachelard, supra note 5; Sophie York Turramurra, Letter to the
Editor, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 21, 2007, at 14 (expressing the view that non-
authoritarian ethics education is improperly intolerant of religion); Editorial, Christianity
Is Outclassed, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 16, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/
telegraph-view/3602661/Christianity-is-outclassed.html (objecting to the idea that
children should question received religious beliefs).
12 See, e.g., The Subversion of Religion and Morals (continued),
http://www.melaniephillips.com/diary/?p=267 (Feb. 17, 2004),
http://www.melaniephillips.com/diary/archives/000330.html. Melanie Phillips, a
columnist for the British Daily Mail, rejects the secular dialogic approach to ethics and
religious education suggested at the IPPR conference: "the real agenda is not to expand
children's horizons but to narrow them by attacking both the faith they already have and
the family authority that has given it to them." Id.
13 This assumes, of course, that a practical and theoretical distinction can generally
be maintained between legitimate discussion and illegitimate coercion, and it assumes
that something like viewpoint-neutrality can be maintained in a classroom devoted to
discussing viewpoints. Although parts of this Note can be regarded as arguing for the
soundness of these general propositions, see infra Part II.B.3, and Part II.C.3 n.173, it is
simply not the project of this Note to mount a full-blown philosophical defense against
those, whoever they may be, inclined to strong skepticism of these possibilities.
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What could happen within the Critical Discussions course, however-
and what seems to be clearly contemplated by some advocatesl 4-is that the
teacher would lecture by presenting various viewpoints on the day's given
(ethical or religious) topic, and then there would be an open critical
discussion among students. 15 This discussion could involve arguing in the
sense of giving and receiving reasons for this or that opinion. Critical
Discussions thus advances a goal of encouraging students to recognize and
understand different viewpoints, while eschewing the kind of moral
relativism that would treat all ethical disagreement as mere differences in
subjective preference or taste beyond any reason or reason-giving.
This Note aims to defend Critical Discussions, and the sorts of dialogic
ethics courses it represents, as a constitutional possibility without any need
for special religious exemptions from participation. In particular, if Critical
Discussions becomes mandatory in the United States, given religious
concerns about the curriculum, a constitutional challenge on behalf of
religious objectors seems likely. This challenge would likely involve claims
of interference with religious exercise and parental rights. 16 Given the
strongest form of such a challenge against an ideal instance of Critical
Discussions, what ought to be the legal result? In answer, this Note argues
that there is no insuperable constitutional barrier to state-mandated Critical
Discussions, at least as far as concerns a challenge based on the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 17 and a notion of parental rights. 18
14 See, e.g., LAW, CHILDREN'S MINDS, supra note 8, at 166 (proposing that students
be presented with "a broad range of different political, moral and religious beliefs and
arguments," and also proposing that students "get at least some chance actively to engage
in discussion with those from other faiths" and with no religious faith).
15 For present purposes, I leave open the question of whether, as part of Critical
Discussions, the teacher should be allowed to give his own opinion. Certainly, if the
teacher was allowed to give his own opinion during the class discussion, it should be
clear to the students that the teacher was an equal participant and not a privileged
authority within the discussion. Reasonable minds might perhaps disagree on whether
this is actually possible, or whether students will always ascribe to the teacher a position
of authority. For my part, I think that it is possible, but the teacher will need to have some
sensitivity and conscientiousness to avoid the danger of being seen as a privileged
participant.
16 Cf Kyle Still, Comment, Smith's Hybrid Rights Doctrine and the Pierce Right:
An Unintelligent Design, 85 N.C. L. REv. 385, 389-90 (2006) (acknowledging the natural
fit between free exercise and parental rights claims in a religiously-motivated case
objecting to school curriculum).
17 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
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If this argument is successful, then Critical Discussions is preserved as a
policy option for state and local lawmakers, and as a constitutional
possibility.
The conclusion argued for here is not obvious. In an article focusing on
the constitutionality of a similar hypothetical mandatory curriculum, 19 Tyll
van Geel argued that the proposed course could not survive a free exercise
challenge given a plaintiff with a sincere and felt religious objection.20 Van
Geel alternatively argued that respect for parental rights militated against the
ultimate constitutionality of the curriculum. 21 Although not conceived as a
point-by-point answer to van Geel, the present Note nevertheless challenges
these conclusions directly.
This Note separately considers hypothetical free exercise22 and parental
rights23 challenges to a mandatory Critical Discussions curriculum. Where
the one challenge informs the other, this is noted.
In particular, under the controversial so-called hybrid rights theory, the
standard of review applicable to the free exercise challenge would be
heightened given a separate parental rights challenge. 24 Assuming the
application of this heightened free exercise standard, this Note considers the
religious plaintiff's problem of demonstrating a free exercise substantial
burden.25 After rejecting various alternatives for conceptualizing 'substantial
burden' (in part, for failing to provide an adequate normative account of the
involved principles), 26 this Note argues for the view that a "substantial"
burden should be principally identified with a particular clash between some
state-required action and a conscientiously-endorsed principle of the
religious plaintiff.27
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.").
18 See infra Part III.
19 Van Geel argued against a proposal by Eamonn Callan. See generally EAMONN
CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 209-17
(1997) (detailing a plan to create autonomous and reflective democratic-minded citizens
by, among other things, requiring students to engage in dialogic "ethical confrontation").
For van Geel's (helpful) summary of Callan's program, see Tyll van Geel, Citizenship
Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON L. REV. 293, 335-42 (2000).
20 Van Geel, supra note 19, at 367-8 1.
2 1 ld. at 381.
22 See infra Part II.
23 See infra Part III.
24 See infra Part II.A.2.
25 See infra Part II.B.
26 See infra Part H.B. 1-4.
27 See infra Part II.B.5.
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Supposing that Critical Discussions could substantially burden a
religious plaintiff, this Note argues that the state's interest in Critical
Discussions nevertheless constitutes a compelling interest sufficient for
constitutionality under the heightened standard.28 This is especially so since
the "compelling interest" standard in this context represents a weak test,
despite its own label.29
By its nature, balancing the state and religious interests against each
other requires accounting for the state's policy interests. The demand to
provide such an account constitutes a legal demand because broad policy
considerations do, in a constitutional balancing test, amount to legal
considerations. Consequently, this Note focuses primarily on the relevant
social goals of Critical Discussions, and argues for the state's interests in
advancing these goals.30 This Note defends the claim that the given account
of the state's social interests is broadly consistent with existing legal
precedent. 31 Additionally, it is argued that Critical Discussions represents an
attempt to foster a particular and special set of skills I have termed "skills of
open discourse." In articulating the nature of the state's interest in developing
these skills of open discourse it is argued that: (1) there are such skills; 32
(2) such skills are in some relevant sense unnatural and require practice of
precisely the kind provided by a non-authoritarian dialogic religion and
ethics curriculum (i.e., Critical Discussions); 33 (3) there is a genuine public
need for the maximal distribution of these kinds of skills, although it is easy
to miss this need given our comfort with a status quo in which bad habits of
discourse are typical; 34 and, (4) children have an independent interest in
developing skills of open discourse that the state properly protects even
against religious concerns. 35
The political nature of these particular arguments cannot be avoided, and
it would be disingenuous to pretend that there is any advance strict legal
necessity to their conclusions. Nevertheless, given a balancing test in which
policy interests count, these arguments matter in constitutionally assessing
the existence of a state's interest in Critical Discussions; hopefully, they will
establish that the state indeed could have a serious and compelling interest in
mandating a course like Critical Discussions. Balancing tests inevitably
2 8 See infra Part I.C.
29 See infra Part II.C.
30 See infra Part II.C.1-3.
31 See infra Part II.C. This discussion focuses primarily on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
32 See infra Part H.C. 1.
33 See infra Part II.C.1
34 See infra Part II.C.2.
35 See infra Part II.C.3.
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involve broad policy considerations, and regarded in this light, there really is
nothing to do but to offer such considerations in their own perhaps not-
strictly-legal terms.
After discussing the free exercise challenge, this Note considers a
hypothetical parental rights claim against Critical Discussions. Somewhat
counterintuitively, "fundamental" parental rights are subject to rational basis
review. 36 But rather than offer a separate analysis of state policy under this
standard-a review anyway subsumed by the compelling interest analysis
offered in the free exercise section-this Note instead considers whether a
constitutional conception of parental rights includes a parental power to veto
particular state curriculum mandates in the first place. 37 This question cannot
be settled by vague Supreme Court pronouncements that parents have the
right to "direct the upbringing" 38 of their children. For both legal and
independent normative reasons, such a pronouncement ought to be taken in a
less-than-absolute sense. This Note argues that constitutionally protected
parental rights generally do not include veto power over state curricular
mandates.39
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGE
A. The History of Free Exercise and the Applicable Legal Standard of
Review
1. A Short History of the Free Exercise Clause
Interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause tend to reflect one of two
opposed broad conceptions of the proper relationship between state and
religion. The accomodationist conception holds that there is a strong
presumption in favor of allowing religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws. 40 On this view, any presumption-defeating governmental
interest would have to be a strong one (certainly stronger than the minimal
level of interest required to satisfy 'rational basis' review). By contrast, the
neutral law approach denies the existence of any presumption favoring
36 See infra Part III.A.
37 See infra Part III.B.
38 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925).
39 See infra Part III.B.
40 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NusSBAuM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALrrY 164 (2008) (arguing for accommodation




religious exemptions from neutral laws.41 Neither the accomodationist nor
the neutral law views represent all-or-nothing propositions with respect to the
subordination or non-subordination of the religious person to the state, but
each view shades the default presumption very differently. 42 The neutral law
approach, for example, could allow that, where a law has the purpose of
regulating religious or religiously-motivated practice, such a law is
constitutionally suspect. 43
The Supreme Court has historically vacillated between these two views
of free exercise, a fact that prevents either interpretive camp from
legitimately claiming the moral superiority of pedigree (whatever such moral
superiority might ultimately be worth). In its earliest free exercise case
confronting a conflict between religious doctrine and state policy in Reynolds
v. United States,44 the Supreme Court rejected accommodation. 45 There, the
Court upheld an anti-polygamy law operating against Mormons who
practiced polygamy as a matter of religious doctrine. 46 The Reynolds Court
41 The label "neutral law" is adopted from Employment Division's rule: "[T]he right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' (citations omitted).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
42 In distinguishing between accomodationist and neutral law viewpoints, I do not
mean to capture every conceivable theoretical possibility, but rather to identify the two
competing interpretive poles for which every serious view eventually needs to account.
These interpretive poles have been noticed by others. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
Justice Brennan's Accommodating Approach Towards Religion, 95 CAL. L. REv. 2187,
2188 (2007) (contrasting the approaches of Employment Division and Sherbert v. Verner
as indicative of a deeper philosophical divide). Some theorists aim for (or at least seem to
have) positions between these two camps. E.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1290 (1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager,
Vulnerability of Conscience] (advancing an "equal regard" theory for adjudicating free
exercise cases, a view that turns out to be indecisive with regard to Employment
Division).
43 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) ("we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official
purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general"); Employment
Div., 494 U.S. at 877-78 (1990) (listing ways in which the Free Exercise Clause limits
government action). In Employment Division, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
adopted the neutral law approach and refused any religious accommodation. See infra
this Part. But this did not afterwards stop the Court from accommodating religious
interest in invalidating the law at question in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye (a
disposition with which Scalia agreed).
44 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
45 Id. at 166.
46 Id. at 168.
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distinguished conduct from belief, and held that there was little in the Free
Exercise Clause to stand in the way of the regulation of conduct.47
By 1940, however, the Court suggested a shifting orientation towards
accommodation. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,48 the Court wielded the Free
Exercise Clause to strike down Connecticut laws governing religious
solicitations for failing to be "narrowly drawn" when that law resulted in the
conviction of religious proselytizers. 4 9 The Court suggested the need to
balance between the state's interest in "peace, good order and comfort of the
community" 50 against the "interest of the United States that the free exercise
of religion be not prohibited and that the freedom to communicate
information and opinion be not abridged."'51 Cantwell, however, is perhaps
inconclusive as a clear statement of free exercise principle, since the
Cantwell Court treated First Amendment speech interests along with the free
exercise interests.52
47 Id. at 164. Reynolds nominally professed a concern that the regulated conduct
entailed a "violation of social duties or subvers[ion] of good order." Martha Nussbaum-
herself clearly in the accomodationist camp--disputes that Reynolds's emphasis on
"violation of social duties or subervs[ion] of good order" actually possessed real
analytical relevance in the decision. Nussbaum points out that Chief Justice Waite in
Reynolds does not really apply the professed 'peace and safety' standard, but that it is
instead enough for him (and the Court) in upholding the conviction that a law exists
criminally sanctioning polygamy. NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 194-95. Obviously, if
"peace and safety" is defined in relation to the very law under challenge, then the "peace
and safety" standard is vacuous; the only relevant point is that the religiously-motivated
conduct violates the law. Given Reynolds's complete deference to the legislative
determination of 'peace and safety,' any temptation to read Reynolds as compatible with
an accomodationist position-as would be the case if Reynolds actually burdened the
state to demonstrate a "peace and safety" interest-should be rejected.
48 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
49 1d. at 311.
50 Id. at 304.
51 Id at 307. A fuller quote of the passage:
The fundamental law declares the interest of the United States that the free
exercise of religion be not prohibited and that freedom to communicate information
and opinion be not abridged. The state of Connecticut has an obvious interest in the
preservation and protection of peace and good order within her borders. We must
determine whether the alleged protection of the State's interest, means to which end
would, in the absence of limitation by the federal Constitution, lie wholly within the
State's discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has come
into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by the federal compact.
52 Id. (emphasizing in the same breath with "free exercise" the policy that "freedom
to communicate information and opinion be not abridged."); see also id. at 300
(characterizing plaintiffs argument as one concerned both with "freedom of speech" and
"free exercise of religion"). Had the speech in Cantwell not been religious speech, it is
unclear that the Court would have ruled any differently with respect to the Connecticut
1574 [Vol. 70:6
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A clearer rejection of the earlier Reynolds approach came in 1963 with
Sherbert v. Verner.53 There, the Court rejected South Carolina's denial of
unemployment benefits to Adell Sherbert under its unemployment scheme. 54
Ms. Sherbert lost her job and had difficulty finding another when she
refused, on religious grounds, to work on Saturdays.55 The Court articulated
a two-prong test for the resolution of Ms. Sherbert's free exercise claim. 56
First, the Court assessed whether Ms. Sherbert was religiously burdened by
the state; and, second, given such a burden, the Court assessed whether there
existed a justificatory "compelling state interest. '' 57 Failing to find such an
interest, the Court held the South Carolina law to be unconstitutional in
denying Ms. Sherbert's unemployment benefits. 58
Theoretically, at least,59 Sherbert shifted the presumption in favor of
religious accommodation and its test became the standard for resolving free
law. This, obviously, makes it difficult to identify the free exercise concern as the
determining factor.
53 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). The Sherbert Court distinguished Reynolds on the
ground that, in Reynolds, the regulated conduct "posed some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order." Id. But this distinction is empty since Reynolds's emphasis on
"peace and good order" was analytically irrelevant dicta anyway. See supra note 47.
54 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
55 Id. at 399.
56 Id. at 403. These two prongs are, for example, implicit in the following statement:
If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand
appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as
a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of
free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's
religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate.'
Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 406-07.
59 There is some dispute over the difference that Sherbert actually made in the
decision of later free exercise cases. On the one hand, there are those who emphasize the
losing record of religious parties before the Supreme Court after Sherbert-a record that
they contend does not make sense if Sherbert's accomodationist stance is taken at face
value. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power
and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 79, 79-80
[hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Congressional Power]:
Sherbert's fierce invocation of the compelling state interest test was never
reflected in practice: in only four cases after Sherbert did the Supreme Court find
that religious believers were entitled to exemptions, and three of those were minor
variations on Sherbert itself---they were cases in which states denied unemployment
insurance benefits after ruling that claimants who left jobs for religious reasons
lacked "good cause" for their resignation.
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exercise challenges for the next three decades. 60 Notably, the two-prong
Sherbert test was implicitly adopted in Wisconsin v. Yoder.61 In Yoder, the
Court rejected the application of Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance
law to Amish youth given an objection on religious grounds. 62 Yoder marked
the only time outside the unemployment-benefits context that the Supreme
Court carved out a religious exception to a neutral law.63
The accomodationist Sherbert-Yoder approach was rejected in
Employment Division v. Smith.64 In Smith, the Court refused to carve out a
religious exception from a "generally applicable" 65 Oregon law criminalizing
all peyote use, including sacramental use.66 Employment Division favorably
cited the anti-accomodationist Reynolds,67 and generally announced approval
of the neutral law approach.68 In breaking with the accomodationist ethos of
Sherbert and Yoder, Employment Division has been the subject of a vast
amount of academic criticism. 69 Employment Division struck a popular nerve
By contrast, for example, Martha Nussbaum acknowledges this losing Supreme
Court record but points to evidence that, in lower courts, Sherbert translated into
meaningful accommodation much of the time for the religious plaintiff. NUSSBAUM,
supra note 40, at 146. See generally Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec & Roger Finke,
Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J.
OF CHURCH & STATE 237 (2004) (studying and quantifying the effects of these free
exercise decisions and law).
60 Sherbert's test was rejected in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885
(1990).
61 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). Yoder is discussed infra Part II.B.4, Part II.C.
62 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
63 Eisgruber & Sager, Congressional Power, supra note 59, at 79-80; NusSBAUM,
supra note 40, at 140.
64 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 884-85.
6 5 Id. at 884.
66 Id. at 884-85.
67 Id. at 879.
68 Id.: "[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' (citations
omitted).
69 See John Gatliff, City of Boerne v. Flores Wrecks RFRA: Searching for Nuggets
Among the Rubble, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 295 n.61 (1998/1999) (collecting
sources). Gatliff quotes Ira Lupu's summary of the state of affairs (offered just three
years after Smith): "[C]riticizing Smith is no longer original or useful; we have all
become repetitive in our criticisms, and by now, our audiences are either persuaded or
turned off." Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme
Court Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REv. 259, 268.
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as well; Congress, acting within months, vainly attempted to reverse the
decision legislatively. 70
Unfortunately for the interest of jurisprudential clarity, Employment
Division did not make a completely clean break from Sherbert and Yoder.
Sherbert and Yoder were distinguished, not overruled. 71 Referring to these
cases and writing for the Court, Justice Scalia declared that:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press.72
This declaration has suggested to some that something of the old
Sherbert and Yoder principles still survive, and, in particular, that a higher
standard of review applies to so-called "hybrid" cases (those cases in which
the free exercise right is asserted in conjunction with some other right).73 On
this "hybrid rights" theory, pure free exercise claims are subject only to a
very minimal review (reflective of Employment Division), but if plaintiffs
can combine the free exercise claim with another claimed right, then the level
of scrutiny is increased to reflect the Sherbert-Yoder two-prong test.
2. Which Standard of Review Applies to a Critical Discussions
Challenge?
Determining the legitimacy of the hybrid rights theory could be key to
resolving any free exercise challenge to Critical Discussions. If the hybrid
rights theory is false, then any such challenge is all but doomed. Given
Employment Division's refusal to allow special religious exemptions to
"generally applicable" law, plaintiffs seeking an exception from participation
in Critical Discussions would be in a difficult position. Whatever other rights
or claims could be raised, the Court would scrutinize such objections under
the anti-accommodation neutral law approach. Mandated pursuant to a
generally applicable law enacted without the purpose of discriminating
against any particular religion, Critical Discussions would clearly be
constitutional under this standard.
70 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). The
constitutionality of the RFRA was rejected (at least as regarded its application to non-
federal law) in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
71 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 876 (distinguishing Sherbert); id at 881
(distinguishing Yoder).
72 Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
73 See, e.g., van Geel, supra note 19, at 304 n.40.
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Unfortunately, it is not clear what should be made of the hybrid rights
theory. The hybrid rights theory has split the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court has yet to resolve this split. 74 Rather than attempt to
resolve this contentious issue here, 7 5 this Note will simply assume in
arguendo that the hybrid rights theory is true. On this assumption, if some
other non-free exercise right can be raised, the level of scrutiny applicable to
the free exercise claim will reflect the heightened Sherbert-Yoder standard.76
Perhaps the most obvious other right in the present hypothetical is a parental
right to direct their children's upbringing. 77 This Note thus assumes that such
a parental right is asserted in addition to the free exercise claim.
74 The Circuits disfavoring the "hybrid rights" theory are the Second, Third, and
Sixth Circuits. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Smith's
'language relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court."') (citations
omitted); Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Until
the Supreme Court provides direction, we believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta.");
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180
(6th Cir. 1993) ("We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise
Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the free Exercise
Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights."). The Circuits apparently taking
a more favorable view of the hybrid rights theory include the First, Ninth, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that the combination of Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause claims
warranted heightened scrutiny under Smith); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68
F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (implicitly accepting the hybrid rights theory but refusing to
apply it); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295 (10th Cir. 2004) (accepting the
hybrid rights theory); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,
1031 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In such 'hybrid' cases, the law or action must survive strict
scrutiny."). Among the Circuits favoring the hybrid rights theory, there is a further split
over the question of whether or not the additional claimed right must ultimately be
vindicated to secure heightened state scrutiny with regard to the free exercise claim.
Compare Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply
heightened scrutiny where the additional claim lacked independent viability), and Hot,
Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d at 539 (same), with Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295
(suggesting that the additional claim does not have to be ultimately vindicated, although
there must be a "fair probability or a likelihood" of success), and San Jose Christian
Coll., 360 F.3d at 1032 (the additional claim must be "colorable").
75 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Three Questions About Hybrid Rights and
Religious Groups, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 192 (2008), http://thepocketpart.
org/2008/03/24/gedicks.htmlyalelawjoumal.org/content/view/651/14; Still, supra note
16, at 391.
76 See infra Part H.C. It should be apparent that assuming the truth of the hybrid
rights theory serves to "raise the bar" for the present Note by presenting an obstacle to be
overcome. The "obstacle," of course, is the Sherbert presumption in favor of allowing
religious exceptions to general laws where those laws burden the religious person (qua
religious person). See supra Part I.A. 1.
77 See infra Part HI.
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B. Locating the Substantial Burden
A free exercise challenge under the Sherbert-Yoder framework requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate a "substantial burden" on his religious exercise. 78
But how should this substantial burden be principally identified? In answer,
this section argues that it is not enough for substantial burden that a student
would experience psychological discomfort, or that a student would be
exposed to ideas he finds offensive, or that a student's religious belief may
shift as a result of the curriculum, or even that a student may emerge from
the Critical Discussions course with a wholly altered religious or ethical
identity. Instead, substantial burden ought to be principally identified with a
particular clash between the student's own conscientiously self-endorsed
values and some particular contrary requirement of the curriculum.
1. Psychological Discomfort/Mere Offensiveness
The hypothetical Critical Discussions curriculum encourages students to
reflect on their own deepest value commitments and to confront viewpoints
which are not their own in a serious way. Critical Discussions represents, in
other words, a dose of anti-dogmatism about values and ethics, and
encourages ethical reasoning skills. Among proponents, these features are
thought to be virtues.79 But for students unused to the kind of reflection and
dialogue envisioned by Critical Discussions, and perhaps particularly for
those for whom ethics is experienced as a simple authoritarian matter, such
reflection and dialogue could be uncomfortable and perhaps even
psychologically disturbing (and no matter how ideal the teacher-
moderator).8 0
Proponents of Critical Discussions-like coursework should thus fully
grant the reality of the inner turmoil that serious discussion of ethics and
78 The precise phrase "substantial burden" appears nowhere in either Sherbert or
Yoder. Nevertheless, the pre-Employment Division standard is traditionally understood in
these terms. See, e.g., Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citing Sherbert as standing for a test incorporating a prong of "substantial burden"); van
Geel, supra note 19, at 353 n.240 (noting that a lesser standard would likely prove
judicially unworkable).
79 See, e.g., LAW, CHILDREN'S MINDS, supra note 8, at 1-3, 164-65.
80 Cf van Geel, supra note 19, at 367 (concluding that participation in a program
similar to that considered here would induce distress or discomfort in an objecting
religious student). This conclusion should not be controversial since this result is
acknowledged by the proponent (Eamonn Callan) of the particular program van Geel
considers. Id. at 342. Advocating dialogue about values in schools, Callan acknowledges
that "moral distress is an inevitable consequence of real moral dialogue under
pluralism..." CALLAN, supra note 19, at 202.
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religion can sometimes induce, and that a program like Critical Discussions
would be likely to induce in some cases. Such psychological discomfort,
however, does not itself rise to the level of a substantial burden on religious
free exercise, even if the cause of the discomfort is to some degree
religious.81 In Lee v. Weisman,82 the Court rejected the constitutionality of
prayer at a public school's graduation ceremony, 83 but emphasized that its
holding was not contingent on the existence of offensiveness as such: "We
do not hold that every state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a
few citizens find it offensive." 84 The scope of legitimate religious interests
does not properly include a right to be always psychologically comfortable.85
One reason for this rule is that, most basically, a purely psychological
account of what it is to be "substantially burdened" as a religious person
misses something in those paradigm cases where we may be bothered by a
failure of religious accommodation. For example, in People v. Phillips,86 an
early state case, a Catholic priest found himself in the vise of dilemma: either
break the confessional sacrament, which his conscience forbade him to do as
a matter of religious principle, or refuse to testify in court as ordered, and
potentially face legal sanction. 87 Whatever one may think about the ultimate
wisdom of allowing the priest not to testify (and then, as now, the point
generated argument on both sides),8 8 the unmistakable burden created by the
law on the conscience of the priest should not be denied. For the priest, there
were deep principles at stake. 89 Even if we imagine that the priest
81 Van Geel, supra note 19, at 354 n.243. Van Geel points to Lee v. Weisman, an
Establishment Clause case, as articulating the relevant principle. Id. Lee v. Weisman
states that "people may take offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious
messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a violation." 505 U.S. 577, 597
(1992).
82 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 597.
85 Id. But cf George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of
Public School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 728-29 (1993) (arguing that
offensiveness deserves a heightened analytical role). Van Geel discusses Dent briefly.
Van Geel, supra note 19, at 354 n.243.
86 Court of General Sessions, City of New York (June 14, 1813); 1 CATH. LAW. 199
(1995). See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 126-29 (discussing the case).
87 NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 126-27.
88 See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (same); id. at 127-30 (acknowledging the existence of some debate on the
issue).
89 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 128.
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experienced some psychological discomfort, 90 it was his own principles
being at stake that reveals itself as the more basic concern. 9 1 In other words,
it cheapens real religious interests to equate them in general merely with the
commonplace desire for psychological equilibrium and freedom from
emotional upset.
Rather, insofar as the constitutional protection of religious interests
tracks some sensible value, that value is the value of integrity of conscience,
perhaps as part of a search for meaning in life. 92 This sort of value, incidental
to a respect for persons as ends, 9 3 is hard to deny, and is also not readily
equatable with mere psychological comfort. It is a concern for the integrity of
conscience as such that makes sense of any feeling for Father Kohlman's
dilemma. Indeed, for some, the right kind of religious being may involve a
kind of striving, suffering, or psychological discomfort. 94 Psychological
discomfort or mere offensiveness cannot be the sine qua non of "substantial
burden."
2. Coercion and Exposure
If offensiveness or psychological discomfort as such does not constitute a
"substantial burden" on free exercise, the same cannot be said for coercion,
including "subtle coercive pressure." 95 The Supreme Court is clear that
where there is state-directed coercion against particular religious beliefs, that
religious belief is burdened.96
90 Interestingly enough, it is not clear that Father Kohlmann, the priest in Phillips,
lacked any inner peace of mind at all. Father Kohlmann had resolved to refuse to testify
whatever the consequence. Id. at 127 (quoting Kohlmann's testimony).
91 It was concern for the priest's principles being at stake that motivated the
accommodation in that case. Id. at 128 (quoting the court's opinion).
92 See id. at 168; cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) ("The Free Exercise
Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship .... ").
93 Cf NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 56-57 (discussing philosophical connections
between Immanuel Kant and Roger Williams in understanding respect for the
conscience).
94 Themes of striving are common enough in religious texts. See, e.g., Genesis
32:23-34 (describing Jacob wrestling with God). One could imagine a religion that held
the attainment of psychological equilibrium to be a supreme good. But the very fact that
we would initially be inclined to respect equally both the pro-psychological-comfort
religion and the anti-psychological-comfort religion speaks to the fact that it is not
psychological comfort as such that is being valued by us, but something else-most
plausibly, the very striving of the conscience that in the one case demands psychological
comfort, and in the other, does not.
95 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592.
96 Id. at 587 ("It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
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In identifying the constitutionally relevant sense of 'coercion' in light of
a challenge to school curriculum, the Sixth Circuit in Mozert v. Hawkins
proposed to distinguish 'coercion' to believe something from 'exposure' to
(objectionable) ideas.97 With this distinction in hand, the Sixth Circuit held
that the objecting religious students were merely innocently exposed, not
problematically coerced, when required to read from and discuss textbooks to
which they objected on religious grounds.98 The pre-Employment Division
court interpreted the students' interaction with the curriculum as "exposure
without compulsion." 99 On this basis, the court held that there was no
substantial burden on the religious free exercise of the plaintiffs100 and
upheld the mandatory curriculum over the objections.10'
Without expressly addressing the exposure/coercion distinction itself,
van Geel nevertheless rejects Mozert's conception of "coercion" given the
Supreme Court's later and greater sensitivity to "subtle coercive pressure"'10 2
in Lee v. Weisman. 103 On this telling, Mozert understands the meaning of
"coercion" anachronistically. 0 4 It is implicitly van Geel's sense that, decided
today and properly sensitive to "subtle coercive pressure," Mozert's result
ought to be different.'0 5
exercise.... "). Weisman was primarily an Establishment Clause case, but it makes sense
to treat its concern to avoid coercion as applicable to the free exercise arena. See van
Geel, supra note 19, at 355-56. Certainly, cases dealing with free exercise have taken
"coercion" to be an analytically relevant concept. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir. 1987).
97 See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063-64 (not using the word 'coercion' but expressing
the idea of an opposition between this concept and 'exposure'); id. at 1067 (holding out
the possibility of a distinction between "exposure" and "coercion" in those terms).
98 See id. at 1063-64, 1067.
99 Id. at 1067 (characterizing Wisconsin v. Yoder as allowing room for the possibility
of "exposure without compulsion").
100 Id. at 1063 (opening Part III of the decision with the declaration that the "first
question" is "whether a governmental requirement that a person be exposed to ideas he or
she finds objectionable on religious grounds constitutes a burden on ... free exercise"),
and id. at 1068 (concluding the same section after lengthy analysis by stating that
"governmental actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious beliefs do not on that
account violate free exercise.").
101 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1070.
102 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
103 Van Geel, supra note 19, at 359.
104 See id. (van Geel says "rather traditional").
105 See id. at 358-59. Taking up a hypothetical challenge to a similar curriculum
proposal, van Geel takes it to be obvious that certain (coercive?) factors would
"especially reinforce" the conclusion that a substantial burden was being imposed on a
religious objector, including that "students are at least a quasi-captive audience, face
authority figures, and peer pressure." Id. at 367.
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Perhaps van Geel correctly claims that Weisman has, relative to Mozert,
a heightened sensitivity to the possibility of "subtle coercive pressure."' 10
6
Such a heightened sensitivity would seem to be a good thing, as far as it
goes; undoubtedly, coercion can threaten integrity of conscience, 10 7 and we
should first prefer no such threat, as opposed to a small such threat.
Nevertheless, despite van Geel, the two cases can be read consistently
such that the evolved understanding of coercion evident in Weisman10 8 does
not necessarily overrule Mozert or its key 'exposure' versus 'compulsion' (or
coercion) distinction.'0 9 In part, this is because it only half-describes things
to say that some situation involves "coercive pressure," whether subtle or
not. Critically, the object of the coercive pressure needs to be specified-
"coercive pressure" to do what, exactly? In Weisman, the coercive pressure
applied to cause the student to do something intrinsically objectionable:
namely, objectively signaling assent to a proposition not actually believed.' 10
What mattered to the Weisman Court was that the "subtle and indirect"
pressure aimed to cause the student to behave as if she believed something
(or held values) she actually did not:
[F]or the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception
that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience will
not allow, the injury is... real .... What matters is that, given our social
conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the
group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.111
Any fair discussion of the First Amendment meaning of "subtle coercive
pressure" in Weisman should account for the fact that that the pressure in
Weisman was aimed at causing action which in itself violated the conscience
of the student.
Consistently with Weisman, Mozert similarly inquired about the object of
the supposed official pressure, and, in particular, whether students would do
something that would signal approval of propositions or values contrary to
their consciences. 112 The Mozert court thought it "abundantly clear" that
students would not be required to do anything in light of the curriculum that
violated their conscience: "It is abundantly clear that the exposure to
106 Id.
107 See infra Part II.B.3.
108 Arguably, however, the Weisman Court understood itself to be applying a
pedigreed, as opposed to novel, concept of coercion. 505 U.S. at 587, 592.
109 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067.
110 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
111 Id. (emphasis added).
112 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1066.
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materials in the Holt series did not compel the plaintiffs to 'declare a belief,'
'communicate by word and sign [their] acceptance' of the ideas presented, or
make an 'affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. '"'113 What bears
emphasis in this declaration is not that the word "compel" is used instead of
the more-evolved phrase "subtly coerce,"1 14 but that the court thought that
the object of official pressure in any case was not any action objectively
signaling approval of propositions or values contrary to the conscience of the
concerned student.
From this viewpoint, Weisman and Mozert do not disagree on
fundamental principle. Rightly or wrongly, the Mozert court did not think
that the actions undertaken by students in light of the state's practice would
signal any kind of acquiescence or endorsement of values or beliefs not held
by the student; the Weisman Court, by contrast, thought that actions
undertaken by that student would signal just that sort of acquiescence or
endorsement. This difference accounts for the different treatment of the
respective plaintiffs, without any need to reject Mozert's exposure-versus-
compulsion/coercion analysis.
In short, there is nothing in Weisman to suggest any fundamental
rejection of Mozert's acceptance of classroom exposure to and discussion of
offensive ideas. In fact, Weisman suggests in dictum its comfort with such a
conception of the space of constitutionally innocent possibilities: "To endure
the speech of false ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is part of
learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open
discourse towards the end of a tolerant citizenry." 1 5 The distinction between
compulsion (or coercion) and exposure remains to inform a proper
understanding of any free exercise substantial burden.
To be perfectly clear, this is not to claim that a First Amendment burden
can only arise through being forced to look as if you agree with something
you do not, as in Weisman; burdens may perhaps arise in other ways. It is
only to say that, as far as Weisman is concerned, it appears that there is no
broader problem in generally distinguishing compulsion or coercion from
exposure.
113 Id. The court made clear, as well, that it would decide differently if the case were
otherwise: "Proof that an objecting student was required to participate beyond reading
and discussing assigned materials, or was disciplined for disputing assigned materials,
might well implicate the Free Exercise Clause because the element of compulsion would
then be present. But this was not the case either as pled or proved." Id. at 1064.
114 But ef van Geel, supra note 19, at 359 (quoting a similar excerpt and arguing for
the incompatibility with Weisman).
115 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590.
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3. Coercion and Belief Determination
Some commentators, including van Geel, have alternately suggested that
the concern to avoid coercion might track a deeper concern to prevent
students' religious beliefs from being re-ordered or re-determined as a result
of interaction with a particular curriculum. 116 Thus, for example, van Geel
objects to the aim of making a student value autonomy when the student
antecedently objects to such a value. 117 This raises a question: is there
something about determining the beliefs of a "quasi-captive""18 student
audience that necessarily involves coercion in a relevant, objectionable
sense? This section argues 'no,' analyzing the concept of coercion and
suggesting that Critical Discussions particularly fails to be coercive in any
meaningful sense.
While we can imagine some ways of determining belief that would be
objectionably coercive, it does not follow that all ways of determining belief
are improper. 119 After all, nearly every classroom aims to reorder students'
beliefs by helping them to master novel concepts of one sort or another-and
in "quasi-captive" student audiences facing an "authority figure," 120 no
less-yet these features of school life do not ordinarily mark out anything of
intrinsic concern. So, reordering-of-belief simpliciter cannot be coercion, at
least if "coercion" identifies something concerning (as it surely did to the
Weisman Court). 12 1
116 See van Geel, supra note 19, at 367 (drawing a picture of a scenario in which a
religious student's beliefs are challenged and treating this as amounting to an (ipso
facto?) substantial burden). Certainly it is plausible to think that, from the viewpoint of
the religious plaintiff, a concern to preserve certain beliefs inviolate is indeed the central
concern. See also Stanley Fish, Children and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L. REV.
883, 887-88 (1997) (discussing the concerns of Vicki Frost, the Mozert plaintiff).
Reflecting on Mozert, Fish rejects the possibility of sensibly distinguishing between
exposure and coercion, characterizing the idea of "education without inculcation" as an
impossible dream and seemingly adopting as his own the "Vicki Frost objection:"
"Exposure is indoctrination and will exercise an improper influence over my children."
Id. at 889-90. However, one need not accept the "Vicki Frost objection" (and its
attendant normative claims) to make some sense of a religious plaintiffs concern to
prevent religious beliefs from being reordered or abandoned.
117 Van Geel, supra note 19, at 367.
118 Id.
119 In general, this point is easily missed by a slanted focus on particular instances of
belief-ordering like indoctrination or inducing cognitive dissonance. See id. at 358
(discussing cognitive dissonance as an instance of an illegitimate, coercive way in which
to order a subject's beliefs).
120Id. at 367.
121 See supra Part H.B.2.
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But if there are some methods of determining belief that are not
intrinsically concerning, there may be others that are. Van Geel provides a
particular example: cognitive dissonance. 122 "Cognitive dissonance"
identifies, or includes under its concept, the psychological state of a person
who acts inconsistently with antecedently held beliefs (such as moral
beliefs).123 Belief-shifting resolves this dissonant inner state. 124 In virtue of
this phenomenon of "cognitive dissonance," a person can frequently be
induced to change his beliefs as a way of alleviating inner psychological
tension. 125 Van Geel's sense-shared by this Note-is that there is
something inappropriate about inducing "cognitive dissonance" for the
purpose of determining someone's beliefs.126
A slightly complicated picture emerges from considering these contexts
together: there are some cases (math class, perhaps) where determining
another's beliefs does not seem meaningfully coercive, and other cases
(inducing cognitive dissonance) where there is such a concern. Assuming
that the Supreme Court can distinguish these cases-and hopefully, the
Supreme Court lacks any intellectual obligation to view math class as
meaningfully coercive-a theoretical question immediately arises: how, in
general, can the one case be distinguished from the other? What gives the
difference between appropriate and inappropriate ways of determining
belief? These theoretical questions have real consequence in separating
legitimate from illegitimate methods of ordering belief such as might be
thought meaningfully and unconstitutionally coercive. And it would not do to
answer these questions in terms of psychological concepts like peer
pressure 127 or cognitive dissonance. 128 These terms, if they have any
appropriate jurisprudential authority at all in assessing problems of
conscience, derive their authority from the very fact that they capture, in the
context of particular cases, instances of illegitimate ways in which to order
belief. So these psychological concepts do not answer the theoretical
question so much as raise it: just what is it to be an illegitimate way of
ordering belief? How should such a concept be understood?
Fortunately, the general account needed here can be found in a
distinction between normative and causal determination, as expounded by the





127 Id. at 367.
128 Van Geel, supra note 19, at 357-58.
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philosopher Stephen Law. 129 Law points out that rational argument can have
the effect of determining our beliefs in a certain way, as can brainwashing
and indoctrination. 130 But in the case of rational argument-and not in the
case of brainwashing and indoctrination-the determination is normative, not
causal. 131 A valid and sound deductive argument, for example, represents a
reason to accept the conclusion, and, if the conclusion is novel, to alter our
beliefs. It shows you what you "ought to believe if you want to avoid
contradiction and give your beliefs the best chance of being true." 132 As Law
points out, it misdescribes things to suggest that the rational determination of
our beliefs is just another exercise of power or domination, as in the case of
brainwashing or indoctrination. 133 Rational determination succeeds in
determining beliefs (when it succeeds, anyway) because the determinee is
already herself committed to the demands of rationality; brainwashing and
indoctrination, by contrast, do not necessarily rely on any such personal
commitment to rationality for success in reordering belief. 134
To whatever extent that Critical Discussions determines beliefs, such
determination falls into the normative category. The idea of the Critical
Discussions course is that students ought to be able to reason and discuss
ethical and religious topics in an analytical way, and that the means by which
students are best taught to do this is by themselves modeling such discussion
under the guidance of a teacher-moderator with some background of ethical
and religious knowledge. In this vision there is perhaps more than an echo of
the Weisman Court's call for a "society which insists upon open
discourse"'135 of a kind that is not merely about inculcating the values of a
perceived orthodoxy, except, necessarily, whatever value it is that insists
upon open discourse in the first place (although one could imagine a
discussion in which even that value is analyzed). The kind of determination
of belief resulting from the encounters in a Critical Discussions class, if
129 Stephen Law, Religion and Philosophy in Schools, in PHILOSOPHY IN SCHOOLS
41, 53-54 (Michael Hand & Carrie Winstanley eds., 2008) [hereinafter Law, Religion





134 It might be more technically precise to distinguish between mere causal and
normative belief-determination; clearly, normative or rational belief-determination can
have causal force. Id. Ultimately, however, the label is not important; what is important is
the point that there is something (for lack of a better word) special about normative
determination of belief such that it does not ordinarily concern us. And clearly, normative
force can not be understood purely in terms of causal efficacy. See Law, Religion and
Philosophy in Schools, supra note 129, at 53.
135 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
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any, 136 should be essentially normative determinations of the kind that can
result from any serious rational discussion and reflection. To label this kind
of normative determination as concerningly coercive, however, misses the
crucial distinction between normative and causal determination. Only causal
determination is worth worrying about.
It is certainly a real possibility that the reflection and dialogue
engendered as part of the Critical Discussions curriculum would have the
effect of determining the re-ordering of students' ethical or religious beliefs,
and potentially in ways uncomfortable to some members of the students'
communities and families. Careful reflection and dialogue generally can have
such effects, after all. But it is not enough to suggest--or even to
demonstrate-simply that a student has reordered (or would reorder) his
beliefs as a result of the Critical Discussions curriculum; what matters is that
this re-ordering is determined in an illegitimate way. What matters is that the
re-ordering is not normatively determined. And there is no reason to suppose
out-of-hand that Critical Discussions would non-normatively determine
students' beliefs. 137
As for the special fact that the discussion takes place before an authority
figure, 138 this concern (if we really do think that it meaningfully marks out
'coercion') can be mitigated by insisting that the teacher not callously
dismiss students' views or dogmatically insist on the adoption of her own
views-or any particular view, for that matter. In fact, the insistence could
be, and perhaps should be, that the teacher's own views remain a mystery. As
for the concern over peer pressure, 139 the rule should be that any non-
normative peer pressure is forbidden. Neither does the "quasi-captive"' 140
nature of classroom experience mark out anything of special concern.
"Quasi-captivity" is simply an unavoidable fact of school life, and not
necessarily indicative of coercion in any meaningful sense. Since the
requirement of mandatory participation does not mark out anything of
concern in any other class, it should not be taken to necessarily do so in the
case of Critical Discussions.
136 Incidentally, the idea that it is at all easy to change a person's mind on big issues
with "enough" discussion is almost certainly false, as anyone participating in or
witnessing such an encounter could attest.
137 One could imagine a particular kind of as-applied challenge to Critical
Discussion where a teacher abused the curriculum for the sake of proselytizing or
badgering students. But since this is not what the curriculum envisions, such special cases
can be put aside for the sake of the present discussion.





4. Identity-Shifting and Yoder
In oral arguments before the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder,1 41
Respondent's Counsel urged the Court to be concerned for the maintenance
of the identity of Amish youth as Amish youth.142 On one reading of Yoder,
the Court seems to have accepted this urging, seemingly expressing a
concern to prevent the state from having any hand in shifting Amish youths'
identity. 143 For the sake of convenience, let this be called the stable identity
principle, since, on this reading, there is assumed to be some kind of
principle under which the state should not pursue policies having the likely
effect of altering minority religious identities. In other words, this is the view
that the state must in some relevant sense preserve the stable identity of
religious groups.
What should be made of the jurisprudential place of this purported stable
identity principle, especially if such a principle were taken to guide an
analysis of the existence of a religious substantial burden? Hopefully, not too
much. One reason to reject the supposed stable identity principle is that there
simply is nothing intrinsically wrong or concerning about the shift of
identities or allegiances as such. Indeed, the very idea of respecting
conscience and conscientious striving suggests the importance of openness to
the possibility that some people may shift identities by altering their political,
religious, or ethical views.
Second, the stable identity principle problematically assumes that
children, in particular, presumptively properly belong-and so should
remain-in whatever social, intellectual, or religious community they
141 Transcript of Oral Argument at 818-20, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (No. 70-110).
142 Audio: Oral Arguments in Wisconsin v. Yoder 41:00-44:45 (Dec. 8, 1971),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1 970-1979/1971/1971_7011 0/argument/70-
110_19711208-argument.mp3. Respondent's council urged concern for the "alienation"
that Amish children would feel if they were forced to confront values and ways of life
alien to their communities, stating that "the child's involvement in the high school is
going to be destructive of his faith" and "psychologically damaging. . ." Id. at 45:15.
143 See, e.g., 406 U.S. at 235:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long
history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish
in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs,
the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and
daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and
their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of
a statute generally valid as to others.
Such a statement could seem to suggest a concern to preserve the identity of the Amish as
Amish.
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originally happen to find themselves. But why should this be so?
Communities can be empowering, but they can also be limiting, and where a
community is limiting, children of that community should not be discouraged
from transcending such limitations. It is logically possible, at least, that some
communities in some respects might deserve less, rather than more, respect.
Third and finally, the state-including the judicial branch-ought to be
indifferent and neutral with respect to whether any particular community
survives in its present form or not. It is not properly the concern of the
judiciary to preserve the identity of minority groups. The judiciary arguably
has an interest in preventing discrimination against minority groups, 144 but
this interest in fair and equal treatment should not be carelessly equated with
a state interest in preserving minority identity as such. 14 5
Fortunately, Yoder can be read alternatively, not as enshrining a stable
identity principle, but as noticing some particular features of Amish belief
inconsistent with the particular practices of a secular high school. 146 The
Amish oppose a life of the mind more or less as such, and so the practice of
intellectual seeking for them is necessarily at odds with the principles of their
religious commitment. 147 In accommodating Amish religious belief, then, the
Court expressed concern for the presence of a direct conflict between a
particular principle of Amish religious belief (doubtless thought to be shared
by both the parents and the particular students) 148 and the very practice of
secondary education itself.149
Consequently, it should not be enough, in demonstrating a "substantial
burden" posed by the Critical Discussions course, to show that such a course
could or would cause students to shift their identity away from a particular
religious community. There is no good advance reason to worry that
someone's identity may alter, or to worry about the aggregate effects that
144 Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 42, at 1248.
145 This view was arguably articulated in Zorach v. Clauson, when Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, recognized that religious sects properly relied only on the "appeal
of their dogma" to flourish. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We sponsor an attitude on the
part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.").
146 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223.
147 Id. (characterizing the Amish as objecting to "conventional formal education");
id at 218 ("The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the
Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively
compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.").
148 See id. at 230-31; id. at 237 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 241 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part).
149 Cf NuSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 142 (similarly characterizing Amish objections
to traditional higher education).
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such a movement may have on larger minority communities. This is
especially so if any shift is normatively determined, as it would be in the case
of Critical Discussions. 150 As the Weisman Court suggested, there ought to
be some tolerance for the give-and-take of "open discourse.' 151
5. "Substantial Burden " Requires a Direct and Particular Clash
Between a Deeply Held Principle and a State-Mandated (or
Incentivized) Activity
Hopefully, something positive emerges out of the above discussion of
what properly does not count as a "substantial burden" under the Sherbert-
Yoder framework: in the curricular context, a substantial burden ought
principally to be identified with a particular clash between some deeply held
principle and a particular contrary requirement of the curriculum. Obviously,
this kind of situation could also involve serious psychological discomfort and
a concern (on the part of religious plaintiffs) to maintain a particular identity
associated with a religious outlook or community. But these factors are not
the gravamen of the free exercise challenge. Instead, the fundamental free
exercise interest reflects the value attached to the integrity of a person's
conscience, a value traditionally connected to religious concerns, but which
perhaps encompasses any kind of serious, principled striving for meaning in
life. 152 It is this sort of value that is threatened when the state requires a
person to take some action that violates their own deeply held principles.
This means that the free exercise challenger of Critical Discussions
should demonstrate that a student's own deeply held principles would be
violated by some particular aspect of the program. Van Geel suggests, for
example, that a religious student may recognize in a course like Critical
Discussions an attempt to make her an autonomous person, and the student
may think that being an autonomous person is simply wrong. 153 To liberals,
this is indeed a disturbing thought because it seems to imply the value of a
kind of ignorance and disability (likely enforced through coercion of one sort
or another), but there are certainly some fundamentalist religious traditions
which value obedience and submission to authority over personal autonomy.
Of course, being an autonomous person consists of far more than actively
participating in class discussion on controversial topics. It is not clear that a
student who participated in such discussions could not remain non-
150 See supra Part II.B.3.
151 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
152 NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 173 (suggesting that "religion" should be
understood to broadly encompass kinds of principled striving not reflecting traditional
conceptions of religion).
153 Van Geel, supra note 19, at 367.
2009] 1591
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
autonomous if required by their religion. Certainly, the idea that Critical
Discussions would necessarily make student-participants autonomous people
seems false. So this particular representation of free exercise substantial
burden may not be a strong one.
As an alternate possible religious objection, Nussbaum points out that
there are some religious traditions that reject as sinful a practice of imagining
oneself in the shoes of another person for the sake of developing ethical
reasoning capacities.' 54 Given this, an objection to Critical Discussions could
perhaps arise because the course explicitly contemplates that students will
consider ethical dilemmas and exercise precisely this kind of ethical
imagination. Perhaps in this way, the course could require some students to
sin in their own eyes. If there was this sort of direct conflict, then there could
be a free exercise substantial burden.
C. The State's Compelling Interest
Faced with a substantial burden, the second compelling interest prong of
Sherbert-Yoder applies.155 The Sherbert-Yoder version of compelling interest
is, however, something of a special creature, "strict in theory but feeble in
fact" in its application against the state. 156 The Supreme Court has never
failed to find the compelling interest satisfied except in unemployment cases
(starting with Sherbert) and in Yoder. 157 Arguably, it was partially the
recognition of this fact as a disconnect between rhetoric and application
which motivated the rejection of the Sherbert-Yoder framework in
Employment Division.158
Given the actual feebleness of the applicable so-called compelling
interest prong of the Sherbert-Yoder test, it would misguide the analysis to
154 NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 328-29.
155 See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
156 Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 42, at 1247.
Eisgruber & Sager point out that this impression of a weak test is not isolated among
commentators. Id. at 1247 n.13 (collecting similar opinions). Even those who reject
Employment Division are sometimes in the seemingly embarrassing position of noting the
thinness of the rationales offered where "compelling interest" is taken to be satisfied. For
example, Nussbaum criticizes O'Connor's concurrence in Employment Division-in
which O'Connor agreed that Oregon's criminalization of all uses of peyote was
constitutional, but applied the Sherbert test to reach that result-for setting too low of a
bar for "compelling interest." NUSSBAUM, supra note 40, at 173.
157 Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note 42, at 1247.
158 This, at any rate, is one way to take Justice Scalia's emphasis in Employment
Division on the fact that plaintiffs rarely won before the Supreme Court under the




work out the content or criterion of such a standard by analogy to cases
outside the free exercise context just because such cases also use the phrase
"compelling interest." 159
Yoder is a better place to look for guidance; the Court in Yoder-the
closest analogous Supreme Court case to the present hypothetical, and the
Court's only non-employment case decided in favor of the religious
plaintiffs-rejected the argument that a general state interest in universal
education could overcome the substantial burden which aspects of that
education placed on the Amish. 160 In particular, the Court failed to see any
harm to Amish youth if they were not obliged to attend high school as
mandated by Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law. 161 Arguably, this
judgment partly stemmed from Wisconsin's failure to advance any serious
theory or showing of such harm that particularly applied to the Amish youth,
a failure noticed at oral arguments. 162 The state argued instead that religious
scruples should not stand in the way of a generally applicable law requiring
compulsory high school education for all youth. 163 In 1972, anyway, the
Court found this unconvincing. 164 Faced with a believable account of some
159 But cf van Geel, supra note 19, at 361-62 (deferring to a dissent by Justice
Brennan in a free speech case turning on "compelling interest").
160 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
161 Id. at 222.
162 Audio: Oral Arguments in Wisconsin v. Yoder 47:00 (Dec. 8, 1971), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_110/argument/70-110_19711208-
argument.mp3 (respondent's counsel notes that no expert witness articulated harm to the
state at the trial). In its brief, the state suggested that an interest in "democratic ideals,"
and the "dangers of ignorance," counseled in favor of mandating high school education
for the Amish youth. See Pet'r's Br. 12, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (No.
70-110), 1971 WL 133705. The state's argument, however, seldom retreated from such
general and abstract pronouncements. In arguing for the supposed interest of the state in
"education" generally, the state neglected to demonstrate the importance of a high school
education in particular to the Amish youth; the state similarly did not argue for the state's
interest in the particular elements of any curriculum. See, e.g., id. at 12, 18 (arguing that
the state has an interest in ensuring that Amish children "receive an education"
generally).
163 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219 ("Wisconsin... argues that 'actions,' even though
religiously grounded, are outside the protection of the First Amendment.").
164 One Comment questions whether Yoder would be similarly decided today. Lisa
Biedrzycki, Comment, "Conformed to this World": A Challenge to the Continued
Justification of the Wisconsin v. Yoder Education Exception in a Changed Old Order
Amish Society, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 249, 250 (2006). In general, Yoder has been the subject
of a fair amount of criticism from a variety of perspectives. Amy Gutmann, for example,
criticizes Yoder's accommodation ("one-way protection") for failing to account for or
appreciate the value of "legitimate democratic laws:"
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tangible, human harm avoided or particular interest served by the Critical
Discussions curriculum, however, Yoder should be distinguished.
This Note now turns to the task of articulating the needed account of
"tangible, human harm" avoided or vital interest served by the Critical
Discussions curriculum. The argument proceeds in two steps: first, it is
argued that Critical Discussions develops skills associated with a model open
discourse; second, this Note argues that it is in the interest of the state to
develop these skills in all students. Two alternative reasons are offered for
this latter claim: first, it is in the interest of the state to have a citizenry in
which the skills of open discourse are maximally distributed; second, it is in
the interest of all children themselves to have such particular skills (and it is
in the interest of the state to advance children's interests).
1. Critical Discussions and Skills of Open Discourse
One reason to require a course such as Critical Discussion is because it
will develop the very skills of open discourse that the Weisman Court
professed to prize. 165 These skills can be thought of as the very skills
encountered in (or which would constitute) a model discussion of a
controversial topic with deeply felt disagreements. Such skills include an
ability to be empathetic to others, an ability to consider one's own position
from another viewpoint, and an ability to identify and offer reasons for one's
own position which one's interlocutor is bound (from his own perspective) to
accept. Participants in a model discussion would interpret their interlocutors
according to a principle of charity-i.e., in the best light. A model discussion
would also involve a component of emotional maturity, defined here as an
ability to keep one's emotions from clouding judgment in ways that would be
rejected if thinking clearly about one's own deepest principles and values.
This, in turn, requires some degree of self-reflection so that one's own
principles and values are clear to oneself in the first place.
There is some reason to think that the Critical Discussions curriculum, or
something like it, would be necessary to providing students with these sorts
Maximizing accommodation of conscience means minimizing democratic self-
government, and one-way protectionists fail to offer good reasons why conscience-
regardless of its content-should be given priority over legitimate democratic laws.
Legitimate democratic laws, after all, also reflect the ethical commitments of
individuals as citizens concerning how their society should be governed.
AMY GuTMANN, IDENTrrY iN DEMOCRACY 183-84 (2003). It should probably be
emphasized that at least some of the disagreements over Yoder are reflections of
related disagreements between neutral law and accomodationist approaches to
free exercise generally. See supra Part H.A. 1.
165 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
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of skills. As defined here, skills of open discourse are in some ways
unnatural. Where discussion is really open such that important disagreements
are not sublimated or ignored, the constant temptation is to paint one's
dialogic opponent in the worst possible light, to exaggerate differences, 166 or
to shy away from the ways in which an opposing viewpoint may require
deeper reflection on one's own principles. 167 Consequently, it is natural that
help is needed to develop these skills of discourse, 168 and one sensible way to
do this is by modeling such skills directly in the discussion of a controversial
or deeply felt topic in a community hopefully not of completely like-minded
people, guided by a knowledgeable teacher. The Critical Discussions
curriculum provides just this help.
2. The Interest of the State in Developing Skills of Open Discourse
But just why is it so important for each and every student to have these
skills of open discourse? Why not allow students who object to developing
such skills to opt out of the curriculum?
At least two kinds of answers are possible to these skeptical questions.
One kind of answer focuses on the interest of the state in having a citizenry
with certain minimum skills, while the second kind of answer focuses on the
interests of the involved children themselves. Both kinds of answers are
suggested in this Note, although this subpart focuses on the first.
In general, we accept the inculcation of socially valuable skills into
children as a legitimate exercise of state power; we accept, for example, the
strong interest of the state in basic literacy or math education. Given a choice
between a society in which these skills are distributed maximally and one in
which these skills are not distributed maximally, we generally prefer the
former and enact policies in furtherance of that end. Society will be better off
166 See Robert Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal:
"Naive Realism" in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 404, 404 (1995) (empirical study demonstrating that group partisans
overestimate their degree of disagreement with other, stereotypically-opposed groups).
167 Cf Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11
TRENDS IN CoGNrrIvE SCI. 37, 40 (2006) (arguing for the reality of a "bias-perception
conflict spiral" in which the over-attribution of bias to others, generated in part by a view
of oneself as the paradigm of reasonableness, leads to (pointless) conflict).
168 Cf. Grants.gov, http://www.grants.gov/search/search.do?oppld=46604&
flag2006=false&mode=VIEW (last visited September 5, 2009). The United States
Agency for International Development-a federal agency concerned with foreign aid-
offered a grant opportunity for "Improved Public Policy Discourse in Georgia." The
stated goal was to "foster a more pluralistic and higher quality exchange of ideas and to
promote more active engagement of Georgian citizens in public policy discussions." It
would of course be tragically ironic if the Constitution forbade pursuing the same
important aim domestically.
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if math and literacy skills are commonplace, and society will be harmed or
made worse unless such skills are commonplace. For this reason, if someone
manages not to obtain basic literacy or math skills, that counts as an instance
of social failure, and something worth remedying (by better policies or better
execution).
Given our acceptance of the involved principle, the question with regard
to developing skills of open discourse is simply one of particular judgment:
why shouldn't skills of open discourse be treated like skills of literacy or
mathematics? Surely a democratic society with maximally distributed skills
of open discourse is preferable to its opposite. More than that, any society in
which these skills are not generally distributed is relatively worse off, and
this constitutes a harm that the state should aim to remedy via its educational
policy choices.
This last point deserves elaboration, because it is tempting to think that
we Americans have gotten along well enough without common education in
skills of open discourse, and so why the worry? 169 But, in fact, we have not
gotten along well enough. Our national politics are hamstrung by narrow
partisanship, balkanized into groups incapable of transcending their
particular viewpoints even if just for the sake of argument, and infused
generally with a poisonous and instinctive dislike for good habits of open
discourse. 170 And to the extent that we consequently lack the conceptual
tools or skills to frame our disagreements constructively, this is a problem
worth fixing.
The problem is not that we disagree with each other (there may be no
cure for this, or none wanted); the problem is how we disagree, and that we
too frequently discuss and frame our disagreements badly. This itself
constitutes a social harm, but it has further harmful effects. An impaired
public discourse can be partially blamed for widespread cynicism and non-
participation in the political life of the nation, a state of affairs that a clear-
169 Cf, e.g., van Geel, supra note 19, at 361-62, 369. Van Geel suggests that a
compelling interest should not be found in cases where the interest in question has not
been "comprehensively" pursued elsewhere. This criterion of compelling interest-and
its companion criterion of actual "consensus" agreement on the goal being pursued-
comes close to elevating the status quo to the level of first constitutional principle. Where
a state comes to understand its actual interests in new and deeper ways, these criterions
effectively ensure in advance that the newly-discovered interest will not be regarded as
compelling, at least for a while, and whatever the state of the attendant normative
arguments.
170 Cf Barack Obama, U.S. President, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), in N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at P2 ("On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty
grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn-out dogmas that for far too
long have strangled our politics.")
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thinking democratic state should regard as relatively worse. 171 And an
impaired public discourse might also lead to blinkered, reactive policy-
making.
There is simply no good reason for a state to accept this relatively worse
state of affairs. There are bad reasons for maintaining the status quo, of
course: habit, defeatism, cynicism, or the sheer lack of imagination. The
harm of not having skills of open discourse is not an obvious harm only
because the present worse state of affairs is comfortably typical. But it is a
harm nevertheless, and a harm which Critical Discussions could remedy
through the development of an unnatural skill-set-namely, just those skills
of open discourse.
Of course, students may not practice their skills of open discourse
outside of the prescribed course. But they also might not ever read a book or
do a sum outside of school. Unless the latter is a reason for the state to
abandon basic literacy or math education given its general strong interest in
the maximal distribution of such skills, the fact that some students may not
practice skills of open discourse similarly cannot be a reason for the state to
abandon a policy of developing such skills generally. If this form of
argument is unacceptable in the one case, it is similarly unacceptable in the
other. Consequently, the state's interests should not be identified with a
prediction about what any particular person will do with a particular skill
(and even the religious plaintiff may have a false idea of their future self).
3. Students'Interests in Critical Discussions
To extend the working analogy a little: general literacy education makes
sensible policy because it serves the interests of a democratic state to have a
literate population. In other words, widespread literacy is a good social
effect. But there is another reason to support literacy education: it serves the
interest of the students themselves, and their future selves. In a literate world,
illiteracy is a disability.
Similarly, people lacking skills of open discourse are, from the point of
view of their own well-being (as distinct from the well-being of the state or
society generally), unavoidably worse off. Questions of religion, ethics, and
values are, over the course of a lifetime, practically unavoidable. To only be
able to deal with such issues from the confines of a single received
tradition-to lack an ability to imagine other viewpoints, or an ability to
reason with different others about ethical issues, or to give and receive
ethical reasons generally-is to be impaired or disabled in a way. It is to have
171 See John Dean, Why Americans Don't Vote-and How that Might Change, CNN,
Nov. 8, 2000, http://edition.cnn.com/2000/LAW/I l/columns/fl.dean.voters.02.11.07/
(blaming such factors for general voter apathy).
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one's beliefs causally and not normatively determined. 172 Moreover, the
value of conscience itself suggests the importance of being able to question
one's own values and principles well.
Given the personal interests that students have in developing the kinds of
skills aimed at by Critical Discussions, an additional way of understanding
the state's interest becomes clear. By mandating participation in the Critical
Discussions curriculum, the state protects the interests of children in
developing these skills. On the other hand, those who would actively refuse
children's development of these skills mistreat children by imposing, or
attempting to impose, a kind of functional disability.
Incidentally, whether students in fact have these interests is separate
from the question of whether they (or their families) recognize themselves as
having these interests. Where the question is about the existence of such
interests as a matter of fact, it should not simply be asserted, by way of
answer, that the student's religion opposes the development of these
abilities. 173 Such an argument would be rejected in other contexts: an
172 See supra Part II.B.3.
173 But cf Fish, supra note 116, at 887-88. Fish seems to make just this kind of
move. Fish points out that Vicki Frost (the Mozert plaintiff) would not respect the state's
professed interest in exposing her children to material at odds with her religious
commitment, because "[t]he value assumed by the court that denied her relief-the value
of developing the ability to see the many sides of every question-is not only not her
value; it is in her eyes the way and vehicle of all evil." Id. at 887. Partially on this basis,
Fish himself rejects as untenable any distinction between 'exposure' and 'coercion.' Id. at
888. However Fish might have ultimately ruled on a case like Mozert if he were the
judge, it is clear that the viewpoint of the religious plaintiff would all but determine
certain aspects of his analysis.
Fish makes a somewhat broader point, worth briefly responding to, along the same
lines when he argues against the advisability of any general program of "making up your
own mind independently of any external authority" (or of helping students to do such
things). Id. Such a program is simply impossible, Fish argues, and ought to be abandoned
as any kind of goal guiding educational policy:
If exposure is indoctrination, in the sense that an idea introduced into the mind
becomes part of its equipment, one of the lenses through which and with which the
world is processed and configured, then the declared goal of liberal education, the
goal of preparing students for 'autonomous decisions making,' is not achievable and
in fact has been rendered unavailable in the first moment of consciousness.
Id. With this, Fish seems to suppose that there is something-he says not what-about
merely having pre-existing conceptual "equipment" which is antithetical to being
autonomous, or to "autonomous decisions making," at least. (Or if Fish does not mean to
identify autonomy essentially with being in a conceptual vacuum, then why in denying
the possibility of "autonomous decisions making" is it relevant at all to suggest that ideas
become part of our mental "equipment" as a consequence of our being exposed to them?)
But taken as a theory of autonomy, at least, such a view hardly seems credible. Of course
autonomy is not about lacking any received conceptual equipment; surely only a being
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illiterate person might think that skills of literacy are overrated, but this
would not settle the question of whether literacy skills are in fact worthwhile,
or whether the state has a compelling interest in teaching literacy. It similarly
should not settle the present question that a person from an illiberal religious
tradition fails to appreciate the value of certain (liberal) practices of dialogue
and ethical reasoning. And if those interests are real and serious then the state
can be justified in enacting policy sensitive to those interests.
Consequently, whether the argument focuses on the good social effects
of skills of open discourse generally, or the value of such skills to individuals
particularly, the state's interest in fostering the development of such skills is
properly viewed as compelling. This conclusion is reinforced by the
relatively weak meaning of 'compelling' in the free exercise arena under
Sherbert and Yoder. 174 And with the compelling interest prong satisfied,
Critical Discussions remains constitutional under the free exercise clause
even under a hybrid-rights theory, whatever its effect on the conscience of
religious objectors.
III. THE PARENTAL RIGHTS CHALLENGE
A hypothetical religious plaintiff challenging Critical Discussions might
present a Substantive Due Process parental rights challenge for either or both
of two reasons: first, because a parental rights challenge could serve to
with some initial concepts could be autonomous. And surely the backers of "autonomous
decisions making" did not actually have the idea of decision-making by actors without
concepts. In which case, Fish argues against a straw man.
If the problem for Fish and his convinced readers is his or their failure to have
imagined any alternate view of autonomy, then a suggestion or two meant to help prime
the pump of theoretical imagination might be in order. Perhaps autonomy is about (or
partially about) being reflective. If so, then why should merely having a conceptual
framework, however received, make reflection, even reflection on that very conceptual
framework, impossible? (Certainly Fish finds himself able to reflect on theoretical
frameworks despite the handicap of possessing received conceptual equipment.) Or
perhaps autonomy is about (or partially about) being appropriately sensitive to reasons,
as, for example, in guiding actions or theorizing about the world. If so, why should being
thus appropriately sensitive to reasons be impossible for someone with "lenses through
which and with which the world is processed and configured"? (Could someone without
any such "lenses" be sensitive to anything at all?) Here, I mean merely to point out some
other possible ways of proceeding before dumping the concept of autonomy on the trash
heap of intellectual history-a radical step which, one might hope, would only be an
ultimate last resort. Certainly, if autonomy is understood in either of these ways (or
maybe others), then Fish's foundational attack on the "goal of liberal education" fails,
insofar as children can be taught to be reflective and sensitive to reasons (and why should
that not be possible?).
174 See supra Part II.C.
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strengthen the free exercise case under a hybrid-rights theory, 17 5 or because a
parental rights challenge potentially provides an independent free-standing
basis on which a court could determine mandatory Critical Discussion to be
improper. Whatever the fate of the free exercise challenge, a court could still
reject the constitutionality of mandatory Critical Discussions on a parental
rights theory. Thus, the parental rights challenge deserves the separate
consideration provided here.
A. "Fundamental'" Parental Rights and Rational Basis Review
As recently as Troxel v. Granville, 176 the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that parental rights are "fundamental."' 177 Tracing parental
rights jurisprudence, the Troxel Court acknowledged the influence of the
original parental rights cases of Meyer178 and Pierce1 79 in taking this right to
involve some measure of control over the upbringing of the parent's child. 180
In Meyer, the Court overturned the conviction of a schoolteacher who taught
German contrary to state law, declaring the right of parents "to control the
education of their own."181 In Pierce, the Court rejected a law effectively
outlawing the existence of private parochial schools, declaring a right of
175 See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the hybrid rights theory); supra Part II.B
(analyzing the likely result given a free exercise challenge under the hybrid rights
theory).
176 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
177 Id. at 66 (plurality). Troxel did not command a majority opinion, but the
plurality's use of the word "fundamental" to describe the parental right was echoed by
Justice Thomas's concurrence, thus giving majority authority for the proposition that
parental rights are "fundamental." Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Consequently, I
agree with the plurality that this Court's recognition of a fundamental right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children resolves this case."). At least one pre-Troxel court
took the question of whether parental rights are "fundamental" to be unsettled. Brown v.
Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1159 (1996). But despite the implication, Troxel was not the first Supreme Court case to
use the word "fundamental" in describing the interests of parents in raising their children.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (speaking of "[t]he fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child").
178 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
179 Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
180 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; id at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). The connection of
parental rights to Meyer and Pierce is enough of a commonplace that protected parental
rights are sometimes simply called the Meyer-Pierce right. E.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch.
Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005).
181 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
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parents and guardians "to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control. '182
Judging the measure of parental rights by these declarations alone, one
might predict that strict scrutiny would apply to state policy infringing on
such rights.183 One would be wrong. 184 Pierce instead suggested and applied
a rational basis level of review where the state's policy implicated parental
rights. 185 Pierce read Meyer as applying a similar standard. 186 And in
rejecting a Washington law that accorded essentially no weight to parental
preference in determining a child's visitation schedule, Troxel's plurality
182 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
183 State actions infringing fundamental right are generally subjected to strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 533, 541 (1942)
(strictly scrutinizing a state policy of forced sterilization of prisoners); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (strictly scrutinizing state infringement of
privacy rights).
184 Cf William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for
Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 187 (2000)
(acknowledging a practice of rational basis review as the usual level of scrutiny for
parental rights claims).
185 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state.
The Pierce court also suggested all the ways in which it was not limiting state
authority:
No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate
all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to
require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of
good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential
to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare.
Id. at 534.
186 Id. at 534-35. Meyer and Pierce's application of a level of review far below
strict scrutiny was remarked upon by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v. Hot,
Sexy, and Safer Products, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995). The court in Brown
quoted Meyer:
The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under
the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to
effect.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
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similarly failed to apply strict scrutiny analysis. 187 It is plausible to read the
Troxel plurality as simply concerned to give parental preference some
weight-some presumptive validity- in a dispute over visitation. 188 This
limited holding, 189 despite its fundamental rights rhetoric, is consistent with
the rational basis level of review advanced in Meyer and Pierce where
parental rights were similarly taken to be concerned. Judging from Troxel, at
most, only Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny review in parental
rights cases. 190
This rational basis level of review for state policy purportedly infringing
parental rights does not help religious plaintiffs challenging Critical
Discussions. If there are reasons for mandating the Critical Discussions
course sufficient to constitute a compelling state interest as argued above, 191
then there are surely reasons sufficient to meet the challenge of mere rational
187 Justice Thomas's concurrence specifically chides the plurality on this score:
"The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a
[parental] right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of
review." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
188 From the Court in Troxel:
The Washington Superior Court failed to accord the determination of Granville,
a fit custodial parent, any material weight.... As we have explained, the Due
Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a
"better" decision could be made.
Id. at 72-73 (plurality opinion); cf Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and
Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
71, 103 (2006) (similarly reading Troxel: "[tihe parental right O'Connor's opinion
protects is the right of afit, custodial parent to enjoy the law's presumption that parents
act in the best interest of their children.").
189 O'Connor's plurality narrowed its holding within the already-narrow context of
the family law of visitation:
[W]e do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the
Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process Clause requires all
nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the
child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need not, define
today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. In
this respect, we agree with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard
for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied
and that the constitutional protections in this area are best 'elaborated with care.'
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
190 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the rest of the Court for failing to
articulate and apply a strict scrutiny standard). Even this much is questionable, however.
Justice Thomas explicitly reserved the question of whether or not the Substantive Due
Process theory underlying the claim to fundamental parental rights is meritorious. Id.
191 See supra Part II.C.
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basis review in light of parental rights. 192 Unless perhaps the religious
plaintiff could convince the Supreme Court to apply strict scrutiny review for
the first time, such a plaintiff would almost certainly lose the parental rights
claim.
B. Parental Veto Power over Curriculum and the Content of Parental
Rights
In order to defeat a parental rights challenge, the state must argue for its
interests in the Critical Discussions curriculum. At this point, however, it
would be redundant to rehash the nature of the state interest in Critical
Discussions in arguing that the state can meet a minimal rational basis level
of review. 193 And, besides, such an analysis already makes a critical
assumption: that parental rights in the first place encompass a veto power
over general curriculum mandates. This assumption is critical because, if it is
false, then a parental rights challenge to Critical Discussions fails to even be
legally sensible. Unless there is a parental right to manage curriculum more
basic than the state's right to do the same, the challenge fails. This section
argues that, in fact, it is false to assume that parental rights generally
encompass a veto power over objectionable curriculum.
Meyer, one of the original parental rights cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment, suggested that parental rights include a right "to control the
education of their own." 194 Meyer took this parental control to prevent the
state from forbidding instruction in a particular subject (modem languages)
against parental objection.195 The parental right of control applied, in other
words, against the actor seeking to limit the child's education-in that case,
the state. But where the parent is seeking to limit the child's education in
some way, it is not clear that much can be said in favor of such parental
rights. Obviously, such a right would not encompass any privilege of parents
to affirmatively impose illiteracy on their children by actively preventing
them from gaining literacy skills, nor do parents generally have a right to
exempt their children from any and all kinds of education. 196
192 See supra Part II.B--C (arguing that the state's interest in Critical Discussion
meets a "compelling interest" standard of review).
193 See Part II.C.
194 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
195 Id. at 403.
196 See Ross, supra note 184, at 184. Ross points to one court's reduction: clearly a
parent claiming an unrestricted right "to control the education" of their children would
not be excused, under the color of such a right, in teaching their truant child "to be a safe-
cracker or prostitute." Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015
(W.D. Tex. 1998).
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But if just a little armchair reflection reveals obvious limitations to the
content of Meyer's parental right "to control the education of their own,"
those limits with respect to school curriculum were suggested in even
stronger terms two years later by the Court itself in Pierce. There, the Court
emphasized:
No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers
and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. 197
This is dicta, but it is dicta with some currency, repeated in a different
form in Justice White's Yoder concurrence, 198 and arguably underlying (in
spirit at least) the numerous circuit court decisions rejecting accommodation
of parental concerns in school policy and curriculum. 199
Indeed, the fact of widespread circuit court rejection of parental attempts
to control the public school curriculum has been recognized-and decried-
by some who seek relatively more accommodation of parental concerns. 200
In a post-Troxel 2005 case, for example, the Ninth Circuit in Fields upheld
197 Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534 (1925).
198 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) (White, J., concurring)
(explaining that the notion of parental rights endorsed by the Court "lends no support to
the contention that parents may replace state educational requirements with their own
idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy
member of society"). In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court repeated Justice White's line in
rejecting the parental rights claim in that case and any absolute conception of parental
rights. 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976).
199 See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods. Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir.
1995) (sexually explicit class could not be avoided by religiously-objecting student and
parents); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to accommodate parental objections to a supplementary reading program);
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1080-81 (6th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to accommodate wide-ranging parental objections to the textbooks used by the
school); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (refusing to
accommodate a parental objection to the mandatory health program); and Fields v.
Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to hold the
distribution of a sexually-oriented survey to elementary school students to be violative of
parental rights). Fields collects and comments on a half-dozen more circuit court cases in
the same vein. See id at 1204-05.
200 See, e.g., Home School Legal Defense Association, Why Do We Need Parental




the constitutionality of an elementary school survey about sexual topics over
parental objections. 201 The Fields decision was criticized by one
commentator for failing to respect the proper integrity of the "parent-child
relationship." 202 In defending a more robust version of the "right of a parent
to control his child's upbringing" 20 3 than the Fields court was willing to
recognize, however, even this critic acknowledged the unworkability of
interpreting the parental right to include veto power over state curriculum
choices, at least in public schools. 204
But if parents properly lack the general power to veto state-mandated
curriculum in the public school context, the same appears true in the private
school context, although such cases arise less frequently. 205 In Runyon v.
McCrary, the Court upheld a federal law which had the effect of outlawing
racially-segregated private schools in the face of a parental rights
challenge. 20 6 As in Meyer and Pierce, the Court suggested limits to parental
rights, even in the private school context:
The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have a constitutional
right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to
select private schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no
constitutional right to provide their children with private school education
unfettered by reasonable government regulation.20 7
Relying on this language, the Sixth Circuit subsequently rejected a
challenge to a state testing requirement applicable to private schools.208
Arguably, an ability to control testing requirements just is an ability to
control the curriculum to some extent. Even in the private school context,
then, courts have held that parental rights are ultimately subordinate to state
mandates.
However Meyer's parental right "to control the education of their own"
is particularly construed, these cases demonstrate convincingly that such a
right simply does not encompass veto power over reasonable state curricular
201 Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005). The survey
asked about the "frequency of 'thinking about having sex' and 'thinking about touching
other peoples' private parts."' Id.
202 Elliot M. Davis, Unjustly Usurping the Parental Right: Fields v. Palmdale Sch.
Dist., 427F.3d 119 (9th Cir. 2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1133, 1134 (2006).
203 Id. at 1133.
2 04 Id. at 1139 ("If the Meyer-Pierce framework allowed parents to exercise control
over the curriculum, the system of public education would be wholly impractical and
unworkable.").
205 Although Pierce was itself a private school case.
206 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976).
207 Id.
208 Ohio Ass'n of Indep. Schs. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1996).
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mandates in general. It might be thought that, to the extent parents can meet
state standards, then they should have control over the curriculum. In this
vein, some states regulate home schooling. 209 But it would be a mistake to
view this kind of parental control as establishing or indicating the primacy of
the parent over the state in determining curriculum choices. By giving the
state the right of defining the standards to be met, such laws already presume
the subordination of parental control to the interests of the state, consistently
with the declarations of the Court since at least Pierce. And without any
presumptive right to control the curriculum, the parental rights challenge to
Critical Discussions, as a curriculum challenge, goes nowhere.
V. CONCLUSION
The hypothetical religious plaintiff objecting to mandatory Critical
Discussions faces several significant hurdles in the quest for a constitutional
exemption from participation, even assuming that such a curriculum
represents a bona fide substantial burden on the plaintiffs religious
conscience. As regards the free exercise challenge, the plaintiff must first
establish the inapplicability of Employment Division's deference to neutral
state law; given this wide deference, the state wins since, by hypothesis, the
curriculum applies to everyone and is not motivated against any particular
view.210 Possibly, Employment Division's wide deference to the state can be
avoided by the application of the hybrid-rights theory; under this theory,
raising a second related rights-claim will heighten the level of scrutiny
applicable to the state vis-6-vis the free exercise claim.211
This strategy, however, encompasses its own challenges. First, the hybrid
rights theory is an uncertain doctrine rejected by some federal circuit courts
of appeals. 212 Second, even assuming application of the hybrid-rights
doctrine, and that a free exercise case can be brought under this theory, the
hurdle set for the state is a low one. Despite its harsh ring, the "compelling
interest" standard in this context historically reflects a weak standard.213 If
the state can meet this standard, as argued here,214 the plaintiff loses.
Even (generously) assuming the general viability of the hybrid rights
theory, the application of this theory to a particular case depends on the
ability of plaintiffs to raise a second related claim, such as a parental rights
209 E.g., 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1 (2008) (Pennsylvania law mandating
curricular requirements for homeschoolers and requiring yearly evaluations).
210 See supra Part II.A.2.
211 See supra Part II.A.2.
2 12 See supra Part H.A.2.
213 See supra Part H.C.
214 See supra Part II.C.
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claim.215 This point may itself be non-trivial: if the additional claim is itself
defeated, then the application of the hybrid-rights theory may also be
rejected.216 Certainly, if, as argued here, the content of the 'parental rights'
concept excludes any general power to veto state curriculum choices,2 17 then,
as a matter of law, the parental rights claim (as part of a broader objection to
Critical Discussions) fails to be properly sensible as such. Even before a
circuit court taking the most generous view of the hybrid rights theory, this
would properly mean that the theory would not apply in that instance. 218
As an independent matter, however, the parental rights claim deserves
rejection whatever the fate of this Note's argument regarding the very legal
meaning of parental rights. Assuming arguendo that parental rights
encompasses some veto power over state curriculum choices, such power
only extends to non-rational state action. That is, the Supreme Court has
consistently articulated a rational basis standard of review for state action
infringing on "fundamental" parental rights. 219 The circuit courts have
consistently followed this lead, much to the chagrin of those advocating a
stronger version of parental rights than the courts have seemed willing to
accept. 220 Critical Discussions, a course which seeks to give students
generally useful skills, is all but certain to satisfy this minimal scrutiny. 221
In its own terms, Critical Discussions does not represent an attempt at
viewpoint indoctrination; it would be entirely consistent with the envisioned
curriculum, for example, to require that the teacher's own particular views on
controversial topics remain a mystery in the classroom. Critical Discussions
is instead about fostering open discourse-and, in particular, skills of open
discourse in relation to important, controversial issues-of the kind praised
by the Court in Weisman.222
Arguably, the state has an interest in fostering these skills of open
discourse no less than other kinds of skills, such as literacy or
mathematics. 223 To those comfortable with the status quo, healthy or not, this
claim can appear grand or exaggerated. But easy cynicism should be rejected
215 See supra Part I.A. 1.
216 See supra note 74. And even in those circuit courts that do not require
vindication of the additional right, there is nevertheless a requirement that the additional
right express a serious claim on which success might, initially, be thought possible. See
supra note 74.
217 See supra Part III.B.
218 Cf supra note 74.
219 See supra Part HI.A.
220 See supra note 200.
221 See supra Part HI.A.
222 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
223 See supra Part H.C. 1-2.
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here in favor of serious reflection: is civil society worse off for a lack of
skills of open discourse among its members? Are individuals worse off for
lacking such skills? I think so; and if so, any religions that prevent the
acquisition and distribution of such skills do real harm.
In evaluating the nature of the state's interest in Critical Discussions,
political, philosophical, and value questions are raised. Such questions are
unavoidable. Questions of the state's interests in a balancing test (as between
'substantial burden' and 'compelling interest') are unanswerable absent some
vision of what counts as the social good generally. And, necessarily, in
finally identifying the social good or its aspects in some way, not every view
can be accommodated. Let each marshal what arguments and vision he may
have; you now know the basics of mine: my idea of social good involves
promoting an ethos of truly open discourse, especially in relation to
important issues of ethics and value.
Finally, it perhaps bears emphasis that, in arguing for the importance of
open discourse and skills of open discourse on important topics like religion
and ethics, the point is not to wholly eliminate important differences on these
matters. The point is rather to encourage and improve the discussion of such
differences. Because religious, ethical, and value questions are important and
do frequently matter, they deserve to be discussed openly, accountably,
decently, and in their own terms, at least some of the time. 224 People and
societies better capable of these open discussions are simply better off, all
things considered. And, fortunately, there is no constitutional reason to
prevent the cultivation of these capacities through a mandatory Critical
Discussions curriculum.
224 Admittedly, this vision rejects certain conceptions of "tolerance." In particular,
the view is that a civil "tolerance" that sublimates, ignores or-worse--patronizes
important differences (as mere differences in taste or tradition, for example) deserves
neither unqualified praise nor careless assent. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING
AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 39 (2008) (arguing that
Lockean toleration ultimately sublimates important moral disagreements in a way that
(unfortunately) encourages balkanized identity-group politics and moral relativism, and
generally suggesting that 'tolerance' is a more problematic social concept than generally
recognized). Such "tolerance" may perhaps be better than some options-clearly, it is
better than literal all-out religious war (which was perhaps closer to the possibility that
concerned Locke)-but it is worse than other possibilities, including the one of a society
of truly open discussion.
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